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INFORMED CONSENT FOR
MEDICATION IN PERSONS WITH
MENTAL RETARDATION AND
MENTAL ILLNESS
Joan L. OSullivant
Breck G. Borcherdingtt
Surgeons must be very careful
When they take the knife!
Underneath their fine incisions
Stirs the culprit,-Life!'
INTRODUCTION
IN MARYLAND, SOME PERSONS with mental retarda-
tion and mental illness, possibly long abandoned by their fami-
lies, may be treated with psychotropic medications designed to
ameliorate symptoms of psychiatric conditions. These treat-
ments may enable them to live in the community, to work, and
to enjoy life, but a small subgroup of patients with more dis-
abling mental retardation may not have the capacity to consent
to the treatment.
Maryland law forbids surrogate decisionmakers from taking
any action regarding treatment for a mental disorder.2 The situa-
t Joan O'Sullivan, J.D., is an associate professor at the University of Mary-
land School of Law, where she conducts the Health and Elder Law Clinic. Her salary
is supported by the Geriatrics and Gerontology Education and Research Program at
the University of Maryland, Baltimore.
tt Breck Borcherding, M.D., practices at Blue Ridge Behavioral Health Ser-
vices, 170 Thomas Johnson Drive, Frederick, MD 21702.
1 EMILY DIcKINSON, COLLECTED POEMS 106 (Peter Siegenthaler ed., 1991).
2 See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I, § 5-605(d)(2) (2000), amended by Act
of Apr. 20, 2001, ch. 189, 2001 Md. Laws 189 (reenacting statute without changes).
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tion has existed for many years, since before the Health Care
Decisions Act was passed in 1993. The previous law prevented
family members and substituted consent-givers from consenting
to "observation, diagnosis, treatment, or hospitalization for a
mental disorder."3 This is the case in many other states as well.
Unfortunately, the symptoms of persons with mental retardation
and mental illness can only be controlled with psychotropic
medications. This state of affairs has continued for many years,
with doctors claiming that the principle of beneficence, often
invoked as a counterpoise to autonomy, finds its rightful but
limited expression.4 Autonomy in informed consent is the abil-
ity of the patient to understand the information provided by the
doctor, including the doctor's duty to explain the procedure to
the patient and to warn him of any material risks or dangers in-
herent in or collateral to the therapy, so as to enable the patient
to make an intelligent and informed choice about whether to
undergo such treatment. 5
In section I, this article will discuss a hypothetical patient,
outlining some practical difficulties in the treatment of mental
health problems without true consent by persons with mental
retardation and mental illness.
The article will go on to describe the history of informed
consent in section II, and how doctors and caregivers may
seemingly avoid informed consent issues when treating patients
with mental illness and mental retardation, who have no surro-
gate decisionmaker.
6
3 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I, § 20-107(f)(1)(iii) (1987) (repealed 1993).
4 See Jay Katz, Informed Consent-Must it Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CON-
TEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 69, 82-84 (1994) (discussing how the beneficence princi-
ple is rooted in the history of Hippocratic medicine and the maxim requiring physi-
cians to do no harm).
5 See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1957) (discussing the duty to disclose where physician did not explain all
the various possibilities surrounding the patient's proposed aortography).
6 In a recent draft, the Inspector General stated that the use of psychotropic
drugs in nursing homes was used properly in 85% of the cases. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GEN., PSYCHOTRoPIc DRUG USE IN NURSING HOMES, DRAFr REPORT No. OIG-02-00-
00490, at 8 (2001) (on file with author). In 8% of cases, the drugs were used inappro-
priately in that they were not medically necessary or reasonable. Id. In 7% of the
cases, reviewers could not determine the appropriateness of psychotropic drug use
due to insufficient medical record documentation. Id The chemicals were not used as
restraints, which is prohibited by 42 C.F.R. § 483.125(/) (2000), but the problems
related to inappropriate dosage, chronic use, and unnecessary duplicate drug therapy.
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Section I will deal with medical ethics in treating those
who have both mental illness and mental retardation.
Section IV will describe the efforts of a newly formed
committee, which will bring legislation before the Maryland
General Assembly in 2002. The legislation will address the
need for someone to be able to consent to authorize psychotro-
pic medications for those who cannot consent themselves.
SECTION I: PRACTICAL ASPECTS
The patient is a sixty-two-year-old man with profound
mental retardation who has been living in a group home for fif-
teen years after a history of institutionalization at a state hospi-
tal going back to adolescence. A recent change in his group
home program has given him a new treating psychiatrist.
Chronic treatment with thioridazine (Mellaril) has occurred for
as long as records are available. The patient record indicated
that he had been diagnosed with "psychosis," although no his-
tory of these symptoms is available. The staff in his group home
is convinced that the medication treatment has decreased
self-injury and aggression and has assisted his sleep. There are
no family members identified as being involved in his care.
Unfortunately, on examination, the patient was nonverbal,
appearing generally unresponsive and overweight. In addition,
the patient exhibited constant restless movements of his arms,
legs, and trunk, and continuous chewing motions of his mouth.
The patient's somnolence, obesity, and movement abnormalities
are consistent with side effects of thioridazine. Specifically, the
movement problems are categorized as "tardive dyskinesia,"
which is a progressive motor side effect most often developing
after years of treatment with medications such as thioridazine.
The movements may be quite debilitating, worsening over time.
Tragically, they typically worsen acutely on withdrawal of
medication or lowering of a dose, necessitating continuation or
even eventual increase in the dose of the offending agent.
7
Id. at 13. This report presents a problem for nursing homes, in that 15% of nursing
homes residents are treated inappropriately.
7 For a full discussion of issues concerning psychotropic medication, see Psy-
CHOTROPIC MEDICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTAL DIsABIITIEs: THE INTERNATIONAL
CONSENSUS HANDBOOK (Steven Reiss & Michael G. Aman eds., 1998).
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With the advent of newer medications that appear to have
less potential for tardive dyskinesia, it is common practice to
discuss with patients lowering the dose of the older thioridaz-
ine-type medication, replacing it with a newer medication if
necessary. Even this does not preclude worsening movement
problems, and either continuation of treatment as is or a change
in medication is unpredictable in regards to outcome. In the cur-
rent case, it is not even clear that the patient has ever had a true
psychotic illness requiring medication treatment, and it is possi-
ble that thioridazine has been chronically used for behavioral
control rather than for a specific psychiatric diagnosis.
Complicating the decision process further is the inability to
obtain informed consent from the unresponsive patient for ei-
ther continuation of medication, or its risky replacement with a
less toxic agent. After examination, it is clear that the patient
does not have the capacity to be involved in the decision proc-
ess. There is no available family member with whom to confer.
Clearly the group home's staff has a strong investment in con-
tinuation of a medication that has improved daily behavior and
safety in the home. The treating physician is caught in a situa-
tion where there is an uncertain and risky outcome with any
medication change and where there is no way to obtain patient
consent either to change medication or to maintain the status
quo.
Under Maryland law, even if family was available, the na-
ture of the treatment as psychiatric negates the possibility of
surrogate consent. 8 Guardianship is an expensive option that is
generally seen in a negative light by the developmentally dis-
abled community, which has embraced the concept of self de-
termination. There is no clear path or support for the physician
or patient in this case.
SECTION II: A BRIEF HISTORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT
The history of informed consent is rooted in the idea that
doctors have the best interest of their patients at heart. Before
the 1950's, physicians were supported by tradition in obtaining
"implied consent" when patients did not object explicitly to an
8 See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I, § 5-605(d)(2) (2000) (stating that a
surrogate cannot authorize treatment for a mental disorder), amended by Act of Apr.
20, 2001, ch. 189, 2001 Md. Laws 189 (reenacting statute without changes).
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ongoing course of treatment, discussed with patients or not. The
conviction behind the Hippocratic Oath is that the physician has
the best interest of their patients at heart. The Oath states: 'I
swear by Apollo and Aesculepius [that] I will follow that sys-
tem of regimen which according to my ability and judgment I
consider for the benefit of my patients ....
The origin of informed consent appeared in a case decided
by the Supreme Court, Union Pacific Railroad v Botsford.10
Mrs. Botsford sued the Union Pacific Railway Company for
negligence in the construction of an upper berth. While she was
a passenger on the train, the upper berth fell on her head, bruis-
ing and wounding her, causing a concussion, and resulting in
permanent injuries. In the first iteration of informed consent, the
Supreme Court said:
No right is more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own per-
son, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of the law.
As well said by Judge Cooley, "The right to one's per-
son may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to
be let alone.""
The Court sustained the plaintiffs award and held she
could not be examined by the defendant's surgeons.'2
In Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,13 the
plaintiff sued a hospital for its physicians operating on her
without her permission. Although unsuccessful in her claim
against the hospital, the opinion, written by Justice Cardozo,
opined as follows:
In the case at hand, the wrong complained of is not
merely negligence. It is trespass. Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon
who performs an operation without his patient's con-
9 Katz, supra note 4, at 73 (alterations in original).
10 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
" Id at 251.
12 id
13 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
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sent commits an assault, for which he is liable in dam-
ages. 1
4
After these cases, physicians continued as they had been:
making decisions for (and not with) their patients. The doctrine
of informed consent did not make its way to the forefront of law
until 1957, where in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University
Board of Trustees,15 a surgeon performed an aortography, with-
out informing the patient about the nature of the procedure. In a
brief statement called the "Duty to Disclose", the Court of Ap-
peal of California said the following:
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects
himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are
necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by.
the patient to the proposed treatment. Likewise the phy-
sician may not minimize the known dangers of a proce-
dure or operation in order to induce his patient's con-
sent. At the same time, the physician must place the
welfare of his patient above all else and this very fact
places him in a position in which he sometimes must
choose between two alternative courses of action. One is
to explain to the patient every risk attendant upon any
surgical procedure or operation, no matter how remote;
this may well result in alarming a patient who is already
unduly apprehensive and who may as a result refuse to
undertake surgery in which there is in fact minimal risk;
it may also result in actually increasing the risks by rea-
son of physiological results of the apprehension itself.
The other is to recognize that each patient presents a
separate problem, that the patient's mental and emo-
tional condition is important and in certain cases may be
crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk a cer-
tain amount of discretion must be employed consistent
with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an in-
formed consent. 16
In 1960, this theory was elaborated on in Natanson v.
Kline. 17 Physicians, who had always been in charge of their pa-
14 Id at 93.
'5 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
'
61d. at 181.
17 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960).
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tients were now faced with communicating to them and taking
their opinions into account. This distressed physicians who
feared the gap between doctors and patients was "unbridgeable
both medically and socially." 19 How much and what type of in-
formation is reasonable or required for physicians to disclose?
A. The Elements of Informed Consent
In a discussion with the patient about treatment, using prin-
ciples of informed consent, the physician or a nurse practitioner
often discusses the nature of the decision or procedure; the rea-
sonable alternatives to the proposed decision; the risks, benefits,
and uncertainties related to each alternative; and the choice of
doing nothing. There is an assessment of the patient's under-
standing, and an acceptance or rejection of the proposed treat-
ment.
The three elements of informed consent are (1) capacity;
(2) understanding; and (3) voluntariness. When a physician de-
termines whether a person with disabilities has the capacity to
consent to treatment, it is often the most difficult hurdle a phy-
sician must face. The question is: does the person understand
the information presented to him?
1. Capacity
A book, Assessing Competence to Consent to Treatment,
20
written by Thomas Grisso and Paul Appelbaum, presents one
standardized questionnaire a doctor can use to assess the capac-
ity of a patient to understand the nature of the treatment being
discussed. The form is the MacArthur Competence Assessment
Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T). It cites the diagnosis, the fea-
tures of the disorder, and the course of the disorder. The form
tells the doctor to tell the patient: "Now that is what we think is
the problem in your case. If you have any reason to doubt that,
18 In 1847, when the American Medical Association promulgated its first
Code of Ethics, it cautioned patients that their 'obedience... to the prescriptions of
[their] physician should be prompt and implicit. [They] should never permit [their]
own crude opinions... to influence [their] attention to [their physicians].' Katz, su-
pra note 4, at 73 (alterations in original).
19 Id
20 THOMAS GRisso & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO CON-
SENT TO TREATMENT: A GUIDE FOR PHYSICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
101-26 (1998).
2002]
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I'd like you to tell me so. What do you think? ' 21 The patient
agrees, disagrees, or is ambivalent. If the patient disagrees or is
ambivalent, the doctor writes the explanation of the patient. If
the patient agrees, the doctor goes on to discuss the patient's
understanding of the treatment. The form has places for each
phase of the treatment to be discussed. It goes on to discuss the
benefits and risks of the treatment; the patient responses to each
benefit and risk. The form continues to discuss alternative treat-
ments if the patient disagrees with the treatment presented and
continues to the final choice of treatments elected by the
patient. The last page of the form lists scores for understanding,
appreciation, and reasoning of the patient. The optional choice
scores an understanding of each alternative treatment.
The principles which would form the basis of informed
consent are these:
* A person should be presumed to have the capacity to
consent unless demonstrated otherwise;
" Capacity should not be presumed by age or diagnosis;
" Capacity is based on a person's actual functioning in a
specific situation;
* Capacity is based on cognitive abilities and affective
states (In other words, both the mental retardation and
the mental illness must be considered when determining
capacity.);
* Multiple assessments should be considered over a period
of time to assess whether the person has capacity;
• Assessments should be conducted by familiar people
and in familiar settings;
* Assessments should be made about the person's cultural
and religious values so they may be taken into account;
* Assessments should evaluate environmental factors (set-
ting, time of day, supports) so they may be taken into
account;
" Assessments should be used to identify ways to enhance
the person's decision-making capacity, through counsel-
21Id. at 2.
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ing, information, adjustment of medications or removal
of barriers (physical, attitudinal, cultural).22
Incapacity usually means that the patient has limited ability
" to reason;
" to remember;
" to see the consequences of his/her actions;
" to plan for the future.
Intact capacity indicates that the person understands her
situation, understands the risks associated with the decision, and
communicates a decision based on that understanding.
Capacity to understand the information delivered by the
doctor is probably the toughest obstacle to overcome when de-
ciding on the administration of psychotropic medications. Many
patients are able to give informed consent, to achieve respite
from their psychiatric symptoms. For others with mental illness
and mental retardation this is impossible, which puts the physi-
cian in an ethical bind. Coming to terms with the ethics of such
a situation is one of the most challenging decisions facing doc-
tors who treat patients with mental illness and mental retarda-
tion.
2. Understanding
Persons with disabilities may need more information than
others about their choices. The person assisting should under-
stand what the disabled person knows before supplying
information. Often persons with mental retardation and mental
illness are confused about their choices and do not understand
what is available to them. The person presenting the informa-
tion should make sure the listener is as cognitively available as
possible.
22 Ruth L Friedman, Use of Advance Directives: Facilitating Health Care
Decisions by Adults with Mental Retardation and Their Families, 36 MENTAL RE-
TARDATION 444, 452 (1998). Over several years, Ellis Craig and a committee devel-
oped a capacity assessment called Capacity Assessment For Self Care and Financial
Management. He can be contacted at the Texas Department of Mental Health and
Mental Retardation, 909 W. 45th St., Austin, TX 78711-2668.
2002]
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Patience and understanding are crucial in presenting infor-
mation to persons with mental illness and mental retardation.
The person presenting the information should be sure to:
* Tailor the language to the person's ability;
* Assess the person's understanding along the way;
* Give information slowly and repeatedly;
* Give information in small segments;
* Use assistive devices when appropriate;
* Make sure written materials are at the appropriate read-
ing level;
" Make sure consent forms are simple.
It is essential to present information in an appropriate for-
mat to a person who has mental retardation and mental illness.
Rushing and trying to get the person to consent are fruitless ef-
forts, which can only result in the person not understanding
what has been presented, nullifying the attempt to obtain in-
formed consent.
3. Voluntariness
Many people with mental retardation and mental illness
have a great desire to please those in authority. People with
mental retardation have been known to confess to crimes they
did not commit because they wanted to please the authorities
interrogating them. This is also the case with physicians, who
the person may want to please, especially if they have had a
long-standing relationship. They may sign the informed consent
form accepting psychotropic medications when they have no
understanding of what the drugs will do to them.
The patient's decision should not be coerced or pressured
by anyone. Consider who should ask for the decision: a person
who has a long-standing relationship with the person, someone
who is more objective, or someone not well known to the pa-
tient.
When deciding whether the patient with mental retardation
and mental illness has the capacity to consent, the physician
should consider the dangers associated with the decision. An
example of this is a person deciding whether to get a flu shot. If
he gets the flu, it is usually of little risk. However, deciding
[Vol. 12:63
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whether to have an operation for acute appendicitis is a more
serious proposition, since without the operation the person
could die from a ruptured appendix. Those around the person
should be very sure that the person is making the decision with
informed consent. Thus, the greater the risk, the greater the
level of capacity needed to make the decision.
Due to the seriousness of the treatment, this concept puts
physicians who treat those with mental retardation and mental
illness in an ethical bind. Section three deals with the ethics of
such a situation.
B. Those with Mental Retardation and Informed Consent
The gulf between doctors and patients is never more obvi-
ous than when treating those with mental illness and mental re-
tardation. Many of the patients who are treated have been aban-
doned by or separated from their families and have no surrogate
to consent to medical care for them. Guardianship of most of
these people is not practical, since social service budgets are
limited, and agencies are unable to hire as many workers as
would be required if all mentally ill and mentally retarded peo-
ple were appointed guardians. In addition, guardianship is dis-
favored in the developmental disability community, for it im-
pinges on the person's autonomy.
Patients are given psychotropic medications in order to
control serious symptoms and relieve distress, and without such
medication those with mental illness and mental retardation may
require higher levels of care, let alone suffer serious discomfort.
Some would be given the medication in a mental institution,
23
some would be put in restraints, some would be subjected to
physical force, and some would be subject to behavior modifi-
cation. With the deinstitutionalization occasioned by the
Olmstead24 decision, it is imperative that appropriate decision-
2 See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I, § 10-708(b) (2000), amended by Act
of April 10, 2001, ch. 15, 2001 Md. Laws. 15 (reenacting statute without changes).
Maryland law establishes clinical review panels, which review the medication that
institutionalized individuals are refusing to take. The statute states that medication
may not be given to a patient who is refusing it unless, in an emergency, the patient is
a threat to his own safety or others, or in a non-emergency, when the patient is invol-
untarily committed for treatment by order of the court and the medication is approved
by the a~panel under the dictates of the section. Id.
2Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). In Olmstead, the Georgia Depart-
ment of Human Resources institutionalized the plaintiffs, who were mentally dis-
abled. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and Title I of the Americans with
2002]
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making for treatment of mental conditions be safely and rea-
sonably supported. Many patients who are treated with antipsy-
chotic medications have been taking the medications for so long
that they may never be safely weaned from them, as in the pa-
tient with tardive dyskinesia, noted above. Many older patients
have incomplete records of past treatments and symptoms, no
clear histories for supporting information, and ever-changing
caregiving staff in their residences. Getting adequate informa-
tion on acute symptoms, let alone getting a past history, is often
difficult for a physician. Because psychiatric disorders are often
defined historically, this absence of information makes past rea-
soning for medication decisions obscure to the current treating
physician.
Given the explosion in psychiatric medication treatments in
the last decade, it is inevitable and appropriate that newer
treatments will extend to all persons, even those with mental
retardation. Although psychotropic medication use in this popu-
lation has been to a large extent inappropriate, and correctly
vilified for its past history, increasingly there is a role for medi-
cation in treating recognized psychiatric disorders in the popula-
tion of those with mental retardation. Support for appropriate
medical decisionmaking in difficult cases must follow.
C. The Law Regarding Those Who Have No Capacity to
Consent
The courts have long dealt with those who have no capacity
to consent in emergency situations, when the person may die or
will suffer grievous loss of function if no one acts immediately.
Maryland law and the policymakers at the American Medical
Association agree that a physician is allowed to treat a patient
without consent if the patient would die or would lose function25
if no treatment is given. This situation occurs most frequently
Disabilities Act of 1990, for the failure of the State to place them in a community-
based treatment program when their doctors said that placement was appropriate. Id.
The Supreme Court held that the State's lack of resources was not a valid reason to
deny the plaintiffs community-based placement, and that a court must take into ac-
count the cost of providing community-based care and the range of services provided
to others with disabilities. I.
2 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I, § 5-607 (2000). This law permits health
care providers to treat a patient incapable of consent if the treatment is of an emer-
gency nature, a person authorized to consent is unavailable, there is a substantial risk
of death or immediate and serious harm, and delay would adversely affect the life or
[Vol. 12:63
INFORMED CONSENT
in the emergency department of a hospital, when one has suf-
fered an accident or an injury and is unconscious, and no one is
there to consent to treatment.
The situation of treating those with mental illness and men-
tal retardation usually occurs in the psychiatrist's office when
the patient is brought in for renewal of her prescription for psy-
chotropic medications. With no one to consent the doctor is
faced with the impractical choice of refusing to refill the medi-
cation, or refilling it knowing that no one with capacity has con-
sented. This puts the doctor in an ethical bind, which will be
discussed in the third section.
The Supreme Court has spoken on this subject. In Ziner-
mon v. Burch,26 Burch sued the State of Florida because the
staff at the mental hospital into which he was admitted knew
that he was not competent. He was heavily medicated, disori-
ented, and apparently suffering from a psychotic disorder, and
believed he was 'in heaven.' 27 The admission staff knew this.
The Court held that Burch was entitled to sue the State, because
the voluntary admission was a violation of his civil rights,
depriving him of liberty without due process. If Burch had been
involuntarily admitted, he would have had periodic hearings and
the right to an attorney.28 Mr. Burch was confined for some five
months without a hearing or any other procedural determination
to show that he had validly consented to admission or that he
met the standard for involuntary placement. This clearly in-
fringed on his liberty interest.2 9 The Court explained:
health of the patient, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty. AL Similarly, the
American Medical Association's policy on informed consent states:
Informed consent is a basic social policy for which exceptions are permit-
ted: (1) where the patient is unconscious or otherwise incapable of consent-
ing and harm from failure to treat is imminent; or (2) when risk-disclosure
poses such a serious psychological threat of detriment to the patient as to
be medically contraindicated. Social policy does not accept the paternalis-
tic view that the physician may remain silent because divulgence might
prompt the patient to forego needed therapy.
CouNcIL ON ETHICAL AND JuDIcIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL
ETHIcs § 8.08 (2000).
26 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
271a at 118.
28 Id. at 134; see also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) ("At the
least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.").29 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 131.
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A patient who is willing to sign forms but incapable of
informed consent certainly cannot be relied on to protest
his "voluntary" admission and demand that the involun-
tary placement procedure be followed. The staff are the
only persons in a position to take notice of any misuse
of the voluntary admission process and to ensure that
the proper procedure is followed.3 °
The Court allowed Mr. Burch to sue the State of Florida under
31
an § 1983 action.
In a similar case in New York, a thirty-nine-year-old
woman, Josephine Buttonow, was converted from involuntary
status to voluntary status after five years at Central Islip State
Hospital.32 The Court of Appeals of New York held the change
in mental hygiene law from involuntary to voluntary status be
read to mean that (1) the mental health patient be accorded the
right to a judicial hearing and review of the change in status as
well as her continued review of such changed status, and (2)
that the mentally ill patient be afforded the same assistance
from the Mental Hygiene Information Service as was furnished
to involuntary patients. 33 Furthermore, the person who has been
adjudicated incompetent has the legal capacity to request, con-
sent, or agree to conversion of her status from involuntary to
voluntary status.34
In a Wisconsin case, Lessard v. Schmidt,35 Ms. Lessard
contended she was denied her due process rights because:
" She was involuntarily committed for a maximum of 145
days without the benefit of a hearing;
" The State failed to make notice of all hearings manda-
tory;
• The State failed to give her adequate and timely notice
of her right to a hearing;
3kId at 135.
31 ld at 139.32 In re Buttonow, 244 N.E.2d 677, 678 (N.Y. 1968).
33 Id at 682.
34id
35 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded by 414 U.S.
473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated on other
grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D.
Wis. 1976).
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* The State failed to give her notice of her right to a jury
trial;
• The State failed to assign counsel to her;
• The state failed to permit counsel to be at her psychiatric
session;
* The State failed to provide for the exclusion of hearsay
evidence and for the right against self incrimination;
* The State failed to provide her with an independent psy-
chiatric examination by a physician of her choice;
" The State permitted a person to be involuntarily commit-
ted without a determination that the person was in need
of institutionalization without proof of reasonable doubt;
" The State failed to describe the standard for commitment
so that a person may be able to ascertain the standard of
conduct under which they may be detained with reason-
able certainty.36
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wiscon-
sin discussed the requirements of due process and said that they
are not static. Rather, they depend upon the importance of the
interests involved and the nature of the proceedings. The court
went on to say, "[w]ith these considerations and the common
law background of our present civil commitment laws in mind,
we turn to the justifications for permitting civil commitment
without the stringent safeguards required in criminal proceed-
ings. 37
The court opined:
In any event, the argument in favor of relaxed pro-
cedures on the basis of a subsequent right to treatment
ignores the fact that unless constitutionally prescribed
procedural due process requirements for involuntary
commitment are met, no person should be subjected to
"treatment" against his will. The argument also ignores
the fact that many mental illnesses are untreatable., [sic]
and the substantial evidence that any lengthy hospitali-
zation, particularly where it is involuntary, may greatly
36 Id. at 1082.
37 Id at 1086.
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increase the symptoms of mental illness and make ad-
justment to society more difficult.38
The court quoted the Supreme Court in Robinson v. Cali-
fornia:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in his-
tory would attempt to make it a criminal offense for a
person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted
with a venereal disease. A State might determine that
the general health and welfare require that the victims of
these and other human afflictions be dealt with by com-
pulsory treatment, involving quarantine, confinement, or
sequestration. But, in the light of contemporary human
knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of
such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to
be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in vio-
lation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
39
Finally, on August 2, 2001, the Montana Supreme Court
decided that an individual subjected to involuntary commitment
has a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.4 °
K.G.F., a woman subjected to involuntary commitment for
ninety days, appealed a court ruling, saying she did not have
effective assistance of counsel at her hearing.41 In remanding
the case for further fact finding concerning the effective assis-
tance of counsel at a hearing, the court cited, as its starting
point, the Montana Constitution's due process clause: 'No per-
son shall be de rived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. 2
18 Id at 1087.39 Id at 1088 (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962)).
40 In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001).41 Id. at 487-89.
42 Id. at 492. Conceptions of informed consent vary with each jurisdiction. In
Tatman v. Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center, a Tennessee court upheld an award
of zero dollars given to a Jehovah's Witness who was given a blood product after
instructing those around him that he did not want blood-products. No. E2000-02163-
COA-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 251 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2001). Yet, in
In re Duran, a Pennsylvania court reversed the trial court's decision to appoint an
emergency limited guardian, who had consented to a blood transfusion, contrary to
the patient's durable power of attorney stating that she refused any transfusion. 769
A.2d 497 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). The court upheld the woman's right under the com-
mon law to refuse blood-products. Id. at 503 (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Bots-
ford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (stating that 'no right is held more sacred, or is more
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In addition, many federal courts have said that due process
applies to involuntary commitment, for to go without due proc-
ess would be to deprive the person of liberty in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In the case of Vitek v. Jones,43 the Supreme Court held that
moving a prisoner from a jail to a mental hospital without no-
tice, the right to a hearing or appointed counsel was a depriva-
tion of liberty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
violated due process. The Supreme Court said:
The District Court held that to afford sufficient protec-
tion to the liberty interest it had identified, the State was
required to observe the following minimum procedures
before transferring a prisoner to a mental hospital:
A. Written notice to the prisoner that a transfer to a
mental hospital is being considered;
B. A hearing, sufficiently after the notice to permit the
prisoner to prepare, at which disclosure to the prisoner
is made of the evidence being relied upon for the trans-
fer and at which an opportunity to be heard in person
and to present documentary evidence is given;
C. An opportunity at the hearing to present testimony of
witnesses by the defense and to confront and cross-
examine witnesses called by the state, except upon a
finding, not arbitrarily made, of good cause for not per-
mitting such presentation, confrontation, or cross-
examination;
D. An independent decisionmaker;
E. A written statement by the factfinder as to the evi-
dence relied on and the reasons for transferring the in-
mate;
carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the pos-
session and control of his own person').
43445 U. S. 480 (1980).
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F. Availability of legal counsel, furnished by the State,
if the inmate is financially unable to furnish his own;
and
G. Effective and timely notice of all the foregoing
rights.44
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district
court, saying that incarceration did not include transfer to a
mental institution, without notice and right to counsel, because
involuntary treatment in a mental hospital was not contemplated
by those who served time in jail. The State's reliance on physi-
cians and psychologists neither removes the prisoner's interest
from due process protection nor answers the question of what
process is due under the Constitution.45
In another Supreme Court case, the Court decided that in-
voluntary administration of medication did not violate an in-
mate's constitutional rights. In Washington v. Harper,4 6 Harper
argued that the involuntary administration of antipsychotic
drugs violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment's right to refuse treatment. Harper was given anti-
psychotic drugs when he was placed in a Special Offender
Treatment Center (SOC) for prisoners who suffer from serious
mental disorders. Harper first was diagnosed as having manic-
depressive illness and later was diagnosed as suffering from
schizophrenia. Harper first consented to the administration of
drugs and later refused to take them. His treating physician
sought to medicate him against his will, according to the SOC's
Policy 600.30. The policy was developed in response to Vitek v.
Jones.47 If a psychiatrist decides that the inmate should be
treated with antipsychotic drugs, and the inmate refuses, the
inmate may be subjected to drugs only if he "(1) suffers from a
'mental disorder,' and (2) is 'gravely disabled' or poses a 'like-
lihood of serious harm' to himself, others, or their property.
Only a psychiatrist may order or approve the medication.
4 8
Second, an inmate who decides not to take the drug, has the
right to a hearing at which a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and the
44 Id. at 494-95.
4' Id. at 488-91.
46 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
47 Id. at 215 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)).
48m
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Associate Superintendent of the SOC are present. None of these
persons may be currently involved with the treatment or diagno-
sis of the inmate.49 If the committee determines that the inmate
suffers from a mental disorder and is gravely disabled or dan-
gerous, the inmate may be medicated, provided the psychiatrist
is in the majority.50
In reversing the Washington Supreme Court, the Supreme
Court held:
As a matter of state law, the Policy itself undoubt-
edly confers upon respondent a right to be free from the
arbitrary administration of antipsychotic medication....
Policy 600.30 is similarly mandatory in character. By
permitting a psychiatrist to treat an inmate with antipsy-
chotic drugs against his wishes only if he is found to be
(1) mentally ill and (2) gravely disabled or dangerous,
the Policy creates a justifiable expectation on the part of
the inmate that the drugs will not be administered unless
those conditions exist. 1
The Supreme Court went on to say:
We have no doubt that, in addition to the liberty in-
terest created by the State's Policy, respondent pos-
sesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the un-
wanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.52
Upon full consideration of the state administrative
scheme, however, we find that the Due Process Clause
confers upon respondent no greater right than that rec-
ognized under state law. 3
49 kid 0
50 Id at 215-16.
51 Id at 221 (citations omitted).
52 Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the ju-
risdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.53Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22 (citations omitted).
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This reasoning has been applied by the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit.5
4
In a more recent case, Riggins v. Nevada,55 the Supreme
Court held that the forced administration of the antipsychotic
drug Mellaril (thioridazine) during the homicide and robbery
trial of Riggins was a violation of his rights under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The Court said that the forced admini-
stration of Mellaril denied him 'a full and fair trial.' 56 Because
Riggins was going to use insanity as a defense, the forced medi-
cation of Mellaril altered his mental state so that jurors did not
see him in his true mental condition. The Court quoted Harper,
stating, "'[t]he forcible injection of medication into a noncon-
senting person's body,' we said, 'represents a substantial inter-
ference with that person's liberty. ' 5
The Court went on to say that in the case of an antipsy-
chotic drug like Mellaril, that interference is particularly severe:
The purpose of the drugs is to alter the chemical balance
in a patient's brain, leading to changes, intended to be
beneficial, in his or her cognitive processes. While the
therapeutic benefits of antipsychotic drugs are well
documented, it is also true that the drugs can have seri-
ous, even fatal, side effects.58
The Court reversed the Nevada Supreme Court because the
state courts had failed to make a finding sufficient to justify the
forced administration of the drug during Riggins's trial. This
error violated Riggins's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments, including his right to a full and fair trial and his
54 See United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 260-62 (4th Cir. 1999) (uphold-
ing the State's right to treat a prison inmate who has serious mental illness with an-
tipsychotic drugs so long as the decisions are made under a propr medical profes-
sional and with adequate procedural safeguards); Hogan v. Carter, 85 F.3d 1113 (4th
Cir. 1996) (holding that Harper had not established any particular procedure that
must proceed a one-time dose of an antipsychotic drug in an emergency situation, and
that the State retains the authority to administer these drugs in such a situation); see
also Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Harper for the
proposition that the rationale basis standard of scrutiny applies to prison administra-
tion challenges even when the infringed right would otherwise call for strict scru-
tiny). Note that Maryland is in the Fourth Circuit.
5 504 U.S. 127 (1992).56 Id at 133.
57 Id at 134 (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990)).
58 Id (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990)).
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due process liberty interest in freedom from unwanted antipsy-
chotic drugs.59
In a 1997 Maryland case, the Court of Special Appeals re-
versed the trial court in a case involving the involuntary admini-
stration of antipsychotic medication while a patient posed no
danger to himself or others while involuntarily committed. The
case, Martin v. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene,60
asked whether a patient of a mental hospital who posed no dan-
ger to himself or others, could be forcibly medicated by a Clini-
cal Review Panel, which operated in mental hospitals to over-
ride the protestations of patients who did not want to take their
medications. The court began its analysis by considering the
statute's requirement that the Clinical Review Panel may
approve the administration of mediation or medications
... if the panel determines that ... without the medica-
tion, the individual is at substantial risk of continued
hospitalization because of... remaining seriously men-
tally ill with no significant relief of the mental illness
symptoms that cause the individual to be a danger to the
individual or to others. 6
1
The court held that since the General Assembly had written the
text in the present tense, the valid meaning of the phrase meant
that the person could not be forcibly medicated unless in the
institution, the individual presented a danger to himself or to
others.62
The following year, the General Assembly reenacted the
legislation concerning the Clinical Review Panels, and changed
the language so persons may be forcibly medicated in order for
them to leave the institution. The section now says:
(g) Approval of medication by panel.- The panel may
approve the administration of medication or medications
and may recommend and approve alternative medica-
tions if the panel determines that:
'9 Id at 127-38.
6o 691 A.2d 252 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997), cert. granted, 695 A.2d 1230
(Md. 1997), vacated as moot, 703 A.2d 166 (Md. 1997).
61 Id at 255.
62 id at 256.
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(3) Without the medication, the individual is at substan-
tial risk of continued hospitalization because of:
(i) Remaining seriously mentally ill with no significant
relief of the mental illness symptoms that cause the in-
dividual to be a danger to the individual or to others;
(ii) Remaining seriously mentally ill for a significantly
longer period of time with mental illness symptoms that
cause the individual to be a danger to the individual or
to others; or
(iii) Relapsing into a condition in which the individual
is in danger of serious physical harm resulting from the
individual's inability to provide for the individual's es-
sential human needs of health and safety.63
In Steele v. Hamilton County Community Mental Health
Board,64 the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the right of an invol-
untarily committed patient to be given antipsychotic drugs
without his consent. The court based this decision on the parens
patriae65 authority of the State: the right of the State to care for
its citizens who are unable to care for themselves. 66 The court
said:
Because this power turns on a person's inability to care
for himself/herself, it is legitimately invoked in forced-
medication cases only when the patient lacks the capac-
ity to make an informed decision regarding his/her
treatment .... Thus, we hold that when an involuntary
committed mentally ill patient, who does not pose an
imminent threat of harm to himself/herself or others,
lacks the capacity to give or withhold informed consent
regarding his/her treatment, the state's parens patriae
63 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I, § 10-708(g)(3) (2000), amended by Act
of April 10, 2001, ch. 15, 2001 Md. Laws. 15 (reenacting statute without changes).
64 736 N.E.2d 10 (Ohio 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1376 (2001).
65 Parens patriae means 'parent of his or her country,' and was based on the
authority the King of England had to care for the property of subjects with legal dis-
abilities. BLACK'S LAW DIcrioNARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). Today the authority rests in
the State, as the provider of protection for those who are unable to care for them-
selves. Id
66 Steele, 736 N.E.2d at 18-21.
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power may justify treating the patient with antipsychotic
medication against his/her wishes.
67
The court further stated:
Because of the significant liberty interest affected
when an individual is medicated against his/her will
with antipsychotic medication, we do not come this de-
cision lightly. We have attempted to craft a decision that
acknowledges a person's right to refuse antipsychotic
medication, and yet recognizes that mental illness some-
times robs a person of the capacity to make informed
treatment decisions. Only when a court finds that a per-
son is incompetent to make informed treatment deci-
sions do we permit the state to act in a paternalistic
manner, making treatment decisions in the best interest
of the patient.
68
It is arguable that physicians who prescribe psychotropic
medications to those who have mental retardation and mental
illness are acting under the dictates of the parens patriae au-
thority of the State. In order for them to be acting in this capac-
ity, they would have to be tied to the State in some way. Per-
haps the patient is receiving Medicaid, which might qualify the
physician treating the patient to be acting under the authority of
the State. This is a tenuous argument, however, since the parens
patriae authority is usually given to departments within the
State, such as the Department of Social Services, which can re-
move children from abusive or neglectful parents, and which
can remove incapacitated adults from the care of abusive care-
takers, or to the Bureau of Prisons, which can force prisoners to
take antipsychotic medications.
When no one consents to accepting the long-term side ef-
fects of psychotic medications, it is to deprive the patient of a
liberty interest without due process of law. To go without the
protections of due process would leave the patient without
treatment for her symptoms of mental illness, and subject her to
the unfortunate effects of institutionalization. Physicians em-
phasize that principle of beneficence, as opposed to the auton-
omy advised in the informed consent doctrine.
67Id at 19.
6'lId-at 21.
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SECTION III: THE ETHICS OF PRESCRIBING
DRUGS FOR THOSE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS
AND MENTAL RETARDATION
The Principles of Medical Ethics,69 published by the
American Medical Association, includes several principles that
relate to physicians giving medication to those who are incapa-
ble of consent. The preamble to the principles says that they are
not laws, but standards of conduct, which define the essentials
of honorable behavior for the physician.7 °
The first principle of medical ethics states: "A physician
shall be dedicated to the providing competent medical care,
with compassion and respect for human dignity and rights. 71
If the psychiatrist prescribing psychotropic medications for
those with mental retardation and mental illness takes this prin-
ciple at face value, she could be acting within the scope of the
principle, because she is respecting the patient's human dignity
and rights. To refuse to prescribe the medication would mean
that the patient would become increasingly symptomatic and
remain in discomfort. If the physician prescribed the medica-
tion, she would be acting to protect the human dignity of the
patient, so that the patient's well being and functioning is en-
hanced.
The third principle of medical ethics states: "A physician
shall respect the law and also recognize a responsibility to seek
changes in those requirements which are contrary to the best
interests of the patient. 72
In the case of persons with mental retardation and mental
illness, who have been abandoned by their families, physicians
who seek a change in the law are acting in the best interests of
the patient. To institutionalize a patient who, with medication,
could function in a group home and who would be able to work
and enjoy life, would be a travesty. Seeking a change in the law
is the best solution for this problem, when no one has the au-
thority to consent to the administration of medication, short of
appointing a guardian for each and every person with mental
69 COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS'N, PRINCIPLES
OF MEDICAL ETHICS, http/www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html (June
2001).
70 id
71 id72 id
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retardation and mental illness. Appointment of a guardian
would remove autonomy from each patient. Rarely do guardians
consult with the ward when making decisions about their care.73
The fourth principle of medical ethics poses some problems
for those who have mental retardation and mental illness. The
principle states: "A physician shall respect the rights of patients,
colleagues, and other health professionals, and shall safeguard
patient confidences and privacy within the constraints of the
law."74
When a psychiatrist prescribes medications for those with
mental retardation and mental illness, she cannot keep the con-
fidences of the patient alone, for the patient does not have the
capacity to consent. When the physician prescribes a drug, the
discussion of the patient's behavior must be conducted with
those who work with the patient on a daily basis. The patient
cannot describe the effects of the medication on himself, and
the physician must rely on those who have contact with him on
a daily basis. This may be in the best interest of the patient, be-
cause those working with the patient can describe the side ef-
fects the medication is having, but the physician is not keeping
the confidences of the patient and is breaching his privacy.
The eighth principle of medical ethics states: "A physician
shall, while caring for a patient, regard responsibility to the pa-
tient as paramount., 7
5
When the psychiatrist prescribes medication for the patient
with mental retardation and mental illness, she regards respon-
sibility to the patient as paramount. To refuse to prescribe
medication would amount to a refusal to respect the dignity and
rights of the individual patient. Treating the symptoms of those
with mental retardation and mental illness respects the dignity
of the individual, and respects the rights of those who care for
the patient.
73 Cf. Michael D. Casasanto et al., A Model Code of Ethics for Guardians, 11
WHITrIER L. REV. 543, 548 (1989) (noting that guardians often do not have a prior
relationship with the ward, and will need help from others in learning about the
ward's wishes). The National Guardianship Association has adopted Casasanto's
code of ethics. A Model Code of Ethics for Guardians, National Guardianship Asso-
ciation, at http://www.guardianship.org/pdf/ModelCodeofEthics.PDF (last visited
July 24, 2001).
74 COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 69.75 id
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The ninth principle of medical ethics states: "A physician
shall support access to medical care for all people.,
76
When the physician prescribes psychotropic medication for
her patients with mental retardation and mental illness, she is
supporting access to medical care for all people. To refuse to
prescribe the medication might consign the patient to care in a
less autonomous situation: where he might receive the medica-
tion under the dictates of the statute allowing for review of
medication an involuntarily committed person is forced to
take.
77
The American Medical Association's policy on informed
consent instructs that a patient must be fully informed to make a
decision about his health care.7 8 The physician must explain to
the patient the treatment options, the alternatives, and the side
effects. The physician must enable the patient to make medical
choices among the treatment options. The policy does go on to
say that if there is a medical emergency and the patient is un-
conscious and unable to give consent, the physician can act
without providing informed consent. 79 In addition, if the psy-
chological effects of explaining the treatment options to the pa-
tient would result in serious threat of psychological harm to the
patient, then the physician may decide against describing
them. 80
When physicians consult with those who have no capacity
to consent to their treatment, they often concentrate on caretak-
ers and family, who can report about the effects of the medica-
tion on the person, and the person's reaction to the medication.
This takes us back to the ancient principles of autonomy and
beneficence.
To define autonomy, one can look to The Principles of Bio-
ethics, written by Thomas Beauchamp and James Childress.
"Autonomy is a form of personal liberty of action where the in-
dividual determines his or her own course of action in accor-
76 id.
77 See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. L § 10-708(b) (2000) (authorizing in-
voluntary medication in emergency and non-emergency situations), amended by Act
of April 10, 2001, ch. 15, 2001 Md. Laws. 15 (reenacting statute without changes).
78 See CoUNcIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE
OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 8.08 (2000).
79 id.
so Id.
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dance with a plan chosen by himself or herself."81 Respect for
individuals as autonomous agents entitles them "to such
autonomous determination without limitations on their liberty
being imposed by others. 82
In contrast, the principle of beneficence
requires not only that we treat persons autonomously
and not harm them but also that we contribute to their
health and welfare.... [I]t is the duty to help others fur-
ther their important and legitimate interests .... to con-
fer benefits and actively to prevent and remove harms..
[and] to balance the good it is possible to produce
against the harms that might result from doing or not
doing the good.83
Some patients will never be able to understand the choices,
alternatives, and side effects of the drugs they are taking. To
obtain consent from such patients, one has to suspend disbelief
that the person understands what the doctor is saying, and have
the person sign on the dotted line. This happens in many situa-
tions, when the care staff knows that patients have no under-
standing about what they are signing. This reminds us of the
case of Mr. Burch, who sued the State of Florida for voluntarily
admitting him to a mental hospital when the staff knew he was
delusional and believed he was in heaven.84
For physicians to accept the informed consent of someone
they know is uncomprehending is to return to the principle of
beneficence, as if informed consent did not exist. Unless the
concept of joint decisionmaking becomes part of the ethos of
the medical profession, informed consent will ever remain a
"fairy tale."8 Some physicians have said that they first make a
professional judgment about what treatment is best for the pa-
tient, and then they deliver a speech to the patient about the
risks and benefits of the treatment.86 Yet, consider that physi-
cians may have great uncertainty in any forthright discussion of
treatment alternatives. For many reasons, physicians may be
81 TOM L BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHics 56 (1979).
82Id at 58.
83 Id at 135-36.
84 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118 (1990).
8 Katz, supra note 4, at 91.86 Id at 84.
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averse to consciously consider this information themselves, and
more averse to communicating it to patients. 87 The ethics of
treating those with mental retardation and mental illness who
have no ability to comprehend a discussion of the risks, bene-
fits, and side effects of psychotropic medication is fraught with
difficulty. Physicians must walk a thin line between treating
without consent and recognizing that if they do not act, the pa-
tient's symptoms will be exacerbated, and the patient will be
institutionalized, and live a conscripted life. The principle of
beneficence serves the physician well in this instance, for to re-
fuse to act would result in harm to the patient.
SECTION IV: THE COMMITTEE DESIGNING
LEGISLATION IN MARYLAND
The Developmental Disabilities Administration (DDA) of
the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene has
formed a committee to address the needs of those who have no
one to consent to the administration of psychotropic medication.
The committee is made up of administrators from the DDA, and
others who advocate for those with mental retardation and men-
tal illness. The committee has been meeting since the spring of
2001 to draft legislation which will be introduced to the Mary-
land General Assembly in January 2002.
The committee is contemplating allowing those who are
close to the patient to make decisions concerning informed con-
sent. This is based on a model used in New York for those in
institutions.88 In New York, a committee of volunteers meets to
decide about invasive medical treatment for patients who have
no capacity to consent. The patient is appointed a lawyer to ad-
vocate for him and a hearing is held with four volunteers pre-
sent. The volunteers listen to both pro and con arguments, and
make a decision at the end of the hearing. The patient has the
right to take the case to court if he does not agree with the deci-
sion.
871d
88 See Clarence J. Sundram & Paul F. Stavis, Obtaining Informed Consent for
Treatments of Mentally Incompetent Patients: A Decade Under New York's Innova-
tive Approach, 22 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 170 (1999) (describing New York's Sur-
rogate Decision-Making Program, which permits trained volunteers to exercise medi-
cal decisionmaking for the mentally disabled, when there are no authorized family
members or guardians).
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This is also similar to a Colorado law which allows those
close to the patient to make treatment decisions. The Colorado
statute allows relatives or friends who are close to the patient to
make treatment decisions if the patient is incapacitated.89 There
is no restriction on the decisions that the surrogate decision-
maker can make, including those dealing with mental health,
except that in instances where the proxy wishes to withhold arti-
ficial nourishment or hydration, the attending physician, and a
second independent physician trained in neurology, must certify
that those means are merely prolonging the act of dying and are
unlikely to restore the patient to independent neural function-
ing.90
Alaska and Massachusetts allow a court to dictate that psy-
chotropic medications be given to those with mental retardation
and mental illness. Alaska's statute allows the court to act if
there have been crisis situations in the past and the facility
wants to use psychotropic medication in the future, or if the fa-
cility wants to use psychotropic medication in the future and the
patient is not able to give informed consent.91 The patient has
the right to an attorney, or if she has no attorney, the public de-
fender shall provide one. 92 The court shall appoint a court visi-
tor who can assist the court in deciding whether psychotropic
medication can be used.93
The Massachusetts statute provides that a court may dele-
gate to a guardian the authority to monitor the treatment process
to ensure that an antipsychotic medication treatment plan is fol-
lowed.94 If the guardian is not suitable to be a monitor, the court
shall appoint a monitor to ensure that the treatment plan is fol-
lowed. Expenses of monitoring shall be paid out of the estate
of the disabled person, paid by the petitioner, or by the com-
monwealth, depending on the order of the court.96 The mentally
retarded person shall be in attendance, unless the court finds
89 COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-18.5-103 (2000).
90 Id § 15-18.5-103(6).
91 ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.839(a) (Michie 2000).
92 Id § 47.30.839(c).
93 Id § 47.30.839(d).
94 MasS. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 201, § 6A(d) (West 1990).
95 Id
96id
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extraordinary circumstances requiring his absence.9 7 In that
event, the disabled person's counsel shall be in attendance.98
The Maryland committee is fielding questions about who
will put the team together, who will serve if no one is close to
the patient, who will train the decisionmakers, whether a major-
ity or unanimity of the group will be necessary for decisions,
what will happen if the patient disagrees with the decision, and
who in the legislature would be willing to sponsor such a bill.
Part of the bill will be for more training for those who are capa-
ble of informed consent. The Developmental Disabilities
Agency will take the lead in training those capable of informed
consent.
CONCLUSION
The issue of prescribing medications for those who have
mental retardation and mental illness is fraught with difficulties.
The use of newer psychotropic medications offers promise to
those who suffer from psychiatric disorders, but requires careful
weighing of risks and benefits. Some patients will never be able
to consent to medical care, while others may be able to partici-
pate with much support. Physicians who work with those with
mental retardation and mental illness face an ethical challenge
whenever they deal with informed consent in prescribing medi-
cation. A change in the Maryland law will address this issue,
but the road to such a legal change is challenging. The legisla-
ture must appropriate money to fund the project-at least to the
extent of the position of an administrator for the program. Vol-
unteers must be found and trained to help make decisions for
those for whom they are acting. They must be able to discern
what the patient would want, and under what circumstances.
The lack of informed consent when prescribing medications to
those who have no capacity to consent puts physicians in an
ethical bind. They can believe that they are acting on the princi-
ple of beneficence, but addressing this problem with legislation
would be a way for all States to take a step closer to making
substituted informed consent available, when absolutely neces-
sary.
97 Id. § 6A(e).
98 1&
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